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I ARTICLESI
The Acton Case: The Supreme Court's
Gradual Sacrifice of Privacy Rights on
the Altar of the War on Drugs
Rhett Traband*
I. Introduction
Random drug testing is currently viewed as a key element of
the "war on drugs" because of its reputed investigative results and
deterrent effect t The use of random drug testing has been
expanded beyond its original intended use as a deterrent. It is now
used to discover drug use by employees in positions affecting public
safety.2 Recently, however, drug testing has crossed over from
* Associate with the Miami law firm of Hornsby, Sacher, Zelman, Stanton & Paul,
P.A. B.S., University of Miami, Fl., 1991; J.D., Villanova University School of Law, 1994.
1. See Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602,629-30 (1989) (finding
that employees' knowledge that they could be terminated following a positive test was an
effective deterrent to drug use). But see Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634 (Stevens, J., dissent-
ing)(stating that mere threat of loss of employment is not a significant deterrent to drug use).
2. For instance, in 1989, the Supreme Court determined that employees such as
railroad engineers who controlled trains could be legitimately tested for drug use because the
need for testing outweighed concerns of privacy. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634. The Skinner
Court held that testing railroad employees following serious train accidents was reasonable
even in the absence of any suspicion. Id. at 624. The Court found that the prevention of
train accidents brought on by drug or alcohol impairment was such a compelling interest that
it overcame any intrusion the testing placed on the employees' expectations of privacy. Id.
at 627. The Court also determined that the employees had reduced expectations of privacy
by virtue of their employment in a "pervasively regulated" industry, such as the railroad
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justifiable employment testing to other arenas. With an eye
towards preventing drug use by children, schools from grade
schools to universities have implemented or considered implement-
ing random drug testing programs.
3
Courts have quickly squelched attempts to drug test all
students, as opposed to a discrete segment of the student body.4
In light of these holdings, schools have had to narrow their
programs to drug test only a segment of the student population -
generally those students participating in interscholastic athletics.
Naturally these testing programs tread on an individual's privacy
industry. Id. For further discussion of the "pervasively regulated industry" reasoning, see
infra notes 115-17 and accompanying text.
In a companion case to Skinner, the Court in National Treasury Employees Union v.
Von Raab, 489 U.S. 656, 679 (1989), found that random drug testing of drug interdiction
agents (firearm-carrying border agents) was reasonable given the government's compelling
interests in protecting the "integrity of our Nation's borders." The Court found that drug-
impaired interdiction agents were susceptible to breaking the law. Id. at 660. The Court did
not, however, extend its holding in Von Raab to customs agents with classified knowledge,
as the factual findings were barren as to the government's need to test these agents or how
these employees would endanger the public's safety. Id. at 677-79.
3. This Article does not address the problems faced by colleges and universities who
wish to drug test student-athletes. Three state supreme courts have different views on the
constitutionality of randomly drug testing student-athletes. Compare Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d
633 (Cal. 1994) (upholding NCAA's random testing program as applied to Stanford
University student-athletes under Fourth Amendment and California Constitution) and Bally
v. Northeastern University, 532 N.E.2d 49 (Mass. 1989) (upholding Northeastern's random
testing program under Massachusetts Constitution) with University of Colo. v. Derdeyn, 863
P.2d 929 (Colo. 1993) (invalidating University of Colorado's random drug testing program
under both Fourth Amendment and Colorado Constitution), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1646
(1994). For a more in-depth analysis of drug testing in colleges and universities and
suggestions for designing a constitutional program, see Stephen F. Brock et al., Drug Testing
College Athletes: NCAA Does Thy Cup Runneth Over?, 97 W. VA. L. REV. 53 (Fall 1994).
4. Brooks v. East Chambers Consolidated Indep. Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759,766 (S.D.
Tex. 1989), affid, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991) (holding that testing the entire high school
student body for drugs was unwarranted and violated the Fourth Amendment); Anable v.
Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22 (W.D. Ark. 1985) (holding that the school's policy requiring drug
testing of any student who violated school drug and alcohol code was improper and
unconstitutional); Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East Rutherford Regional Sch. Dist., 510 A.2d 709
(N.J. Super. 1985) (holding that the school's policy requiring all students to submit urine for
drug testing at the yearly school physical was unconstitutional).
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rights,5 and may run afoul of the Fourth Amendment's proscription
against illegal searches.
In Vernonia School District 47J v. Acton,6 the United States
Supreme Court ruled on the constitutionality of the random drug
testing of students participating in interscholastic athletics in public
grade and high schools. The case arose when the school district of
Vernonia, Oregon implemented a random drug testing program for
its student-athletes.7  The school district cited circumstantial
evidence as justification for implementing its drug-testing pro-
gram.8 Based on this circumstantial evidence, the school district
decided to test its athletes randomly for drugs. The athletes in this
district were viewed as role models, and the school district reasoned
that preventing drug use by athletes would contribute to halting
drug use by all students.9
One athlete, James Acton, challenged Vernonia's program,
alleging that it violated his right to be free from illegal searches and
seizures under the Fourth Amendment"° and the Oregon Constitu-
tion. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon
ruled in favor of the school district, finding that the program was
reasonable under both the Fourth Amendment and the Oregon
Constitution." The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the
5. Schools commonly conduct urine tests to detect drug use by students. In Skinner,
the Court stated:
It is not disputed, however, that chemical analysis of urine, like that of blood, can
reveal a host of private medical facts about an employee, including whether he or
she is epileptic, pregnant, or diabetic. Nor can it be disputed that the process of
collecting samples to be tested, which may in some cases involve visual or aural
monitoring of the act of urination, itself implicates privacy interests.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
6. 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
7. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Or. 1992), rev'd, 23 F.3d
1514, 1516 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 2386 (1995).
8. Some of the circumstantial evidence noted by the court included: drug use and drug
culture were glorified by the student body; one wrestler was injured and a coach smelled
marijuana in the wrestler's room the day after the injury; and, several incidents of drug use
and drug-related crime occurred among both students and student-athletes. Acton, 23 F.3d
at 1516.
9. The school district also articulated the prevention of athletic injuries as a reason for
testing student-athletes. Id. at 1516, 1519.
10. Since the Supreme Court's ruling in Skinner, it has been settled law that urinalysis
constitutes a search for Fourth Amendment purposes. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617.
11. See Acton v. Veronia Sch. Dist. 47J, 796 F. Supp. 1354 (D. Or. 1992).
The Oregon Constitution contains a provision similar to the Fourth Amendment:
No law shall violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, house,
papers, and effects, against unreasonable search, or seizure; and no warrant shall
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district court based on its finding that there was no compelling
government need to test student-athletes." The Supreme Court
reversed the Ninth Circuit, finding no violation of the Fourth
Amendment. 3
Drug testing prospective employees in positions that potential-
ly endanger public safety raises few eyebrows and is begrudgingly
accepted as a necessary evil. 4 However, when drug testing is
applied to high school or grade school student-athletes, the evil is
no longer necessary and the testing becomes particularly invasive.
Against this background, this Article first will examine relevant
drug testing and Fourth Amendment law. This Article will then
analyze the Acton litigation and the Supreme Court's holding.
Finally, this Article will conclude with suggestions as to the
implementation of constitutionally sound drug testing programs.
II. Background
A. Skinner and Von Raab
Every drug testing case should begin with an analysis of the
seminal Supreme Court holdings of Skinner v. Railway Labor
issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath, or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the person or thing to be seized.
OR. CONST. art. 1, § 9. The Fourth Amendment reads:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, house, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable search, or seizure shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall
issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath, or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV (emphasis added - differences between the Fourth Amendment and
the Oregon Constitution are italicized).
The Ninth Circuit in Acton stated that the differences between the Fourth Amendment
and Article I, section 9 of the Oregon Constitution are of no moment. Acton, 23 F.3d at
1518 (citing State v. Flores, 570 P.2d 965, 968-69 (Or. 1977)).
12. See Acton v. Vemonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994).
13. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397. The Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for
further proceedings relating to the Ninth Circuit's holding under the Oregon Constitution.
Id. For further discussion of the effect of the Court's remand, see infra notes 82-84 and
accompanying text.
14. The late Justice Thurgood Marshall cautioned that invoking the war on drugs as
justification for drug testing is not sufficient to overcome its intrusion on privacy:
Precisely because the need for action against the drug scourge is manifest, the
need for vigilance against unconstitutional excess is great. History teaches that
grave threats to liberty often come in times of urgency, when constitutional rights
seem too extravagant to endure.
Skinner, 489 U.S. at 635 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
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Executives Associationt5 and National Treasury Employees Union
v. Von Raab.6 In Skinner, the Court conclusively determined that
urinalysis was a search for Fourth Amendment purposes.17 First
determining that drug testing fit under the "special needs"
exception to the Fourth Amendment and thus vitiated the warrant
and probable cause requirements of the Fourth Amendment, 8 the
Court then assessed the searches at issue in Skinner9 and Von
Raab2" using a Fourth Amendment reasonableness inquiry.
Under the reasonableness inquiry, the Court in both Skinner
and Von Raab measured the extent of the search's intrusion against
the importance of the government interest that was served by the
search.21 The Skinner Court determined that testing railway
workers served the compelling government interest of protecting
15. 489 U.S. 602 (1989).
16. 489 U.S. 656 (1989).
17. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617 n.4 (collecting circuit court cases holding that urinalysis is
a Fourth Amendment search).
18. Generally, all government-conducted searches require the issuance of a warrant that
is supported by probable cause, prior to a search, unless the search falls into a judicially
created exception, such as the search incident to arrest. See Maryland v. Buie, 494 U.S. 325
(1990); Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U.S. 98 (1980). The Court's "special needs" exception
applies to non-criminal searches where the requirement of securing a warrant prior to
conducting a search would effectively vitiate the efficacy of the search. Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987).
In Skinner, the Court concluded that a post-train wreck accident site would be too
chaotic to preserve evidence. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 631; see Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668
(finding warrant requirement impedes conduct of routine administrative searches). The Von
Raab Court stated that it would be extremely burdensome if a warrant were required before
the government could drug test its employees. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 666. The Court also
stated that the primary function of warrants was to notify citizens of the legality of the
impending search and, in the Von Raab case, employees were well aware of the testing
program. Id. at 667.
In New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 340 (1985), the Court stated that requiring
teachers to obtain warrants before searching students unduly interfered with the "swift and
informal disciplinary procedures needed in the schools."
19. The test at issue in Skinner involved mandatory testing of railroad workers following
certain serious train accidents. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 609. Employees were also subject to
permissive suspicion based testing. Id. at 611.
20. The test at issue in Von Raab involved testing all customs agents who were
promoted to or hired for covered positions, including drug interdiction and firearm bearing
agents. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 660-61.
21. See Skinner, 489 U.S. at 619 (quoting Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 654 (1979));
Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 665-66 (stating that where a Fourth Amendment intrusion serves
special governmental needs, "it is necessary to balance the individual's privacy expectations
against the Government's interest...."); see also United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428 U.S.
543, 556-558 (1976) (balancing the government's interest in apprehending and deterring
illegal aliens from entering the U.S. against an individual's Fourth Amendment privacy
interest not to be stopped at roadside checkpoints).
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the public from drug impaired railway workers and that the test
was fairly unintrusive because the workers had reduced privacy
rights. 22  The Von Raab Court only permitted testing of drug
interdiction and firearm-bearing United States Customs Agents,
since the Court determined that there was insufficient evidence to
justify testing all Customs employees.'
B. Schaill: The Seventh Circuit's Take on Drug Testing High
School Student-Athletes
As a backdrop to the Supreme Court's ruling in Acton, in 1988
the Seventh Circuit ruled on the constitutionality of a high school
drug testing program that was remarkably similar to the program
at issue in Acton. In Schaill v. Tippecanoe County School Corp.,24
the Seventh Circuit held that the school system's random drug
testing of athletes and cheerleaders was constitutional under the
Fourth Amendment.'
The drug testing program in Schaill was imposed after a
Tippecanoe County School District baseball coach ordered
urinalysis for his team and discovered that 5 of 16 players were
using drugs or alcohol.26 Concerned by these results and nation-
wide reports of increased student drug use, Tippecanoe County
decided to randomly drug test its student-athletes and cheerlead-
ers.' The program differed little from the Vernonia program,
except that visual monitoring was not permitted as it was in
Acton.28
To assess the Tippecanoe County School District's tests, the
Seventh Circuit first determined that student-athletes have reduced
privacy expectations because they change clothes in locker rooms
where there is an element of "communal undress."'29 The Schaill
22. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 628. The Court found that the railway workers had reduced
expectations of privacy based on their employment in an extensively regulated industry.
23. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 679. The Customs agency had sought to test agents with
classified knowledge, thereby exposing a broad spectrum of employees to drug testing.
24. 864 F.2d 1309 (7th Cir. 1988).
25. Id. at 1310.
26. I
27. Id. at 1310-11.
28. Id.
29. Schaill, 864 F,2d at 1318. The court did not mention cheerleaders as being subject
to the "communal undress" reasoning. However, cheerleaders also had reduced expectations
of privacy because they, like other athletes, were subject to additional rules and regulations
and were required to take a physical examination prior to participating. Id.
[Vol. 100:1
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court also concluded that the school had significant interests,
mainly related to safety concerns, in maintaining a drug-free
athletic program.30 Finally, the court stated that the punishment for
failing a drug test was a loss of a student's right to participate in
athletics - not a deprivation of anything approaching a fundamen-
tal right. 1 Based on this combination of reduced privacy expecta-
tions and a significant government interest, the Schaill court was
constrained to find in favor of the school district.
Serving as a further aid to understanding the Court's decision
in Acton, the United States Supreme Court has held consistently in
other contexts that school children have legitimate, although
reduced, expectations of privacy,32 reduced due process guaran-
tees33 and lesser rights to free speech. 4  In Schaill, the Seventh
Circuit relied heavily on the Supreme Court's holding in New Jersey
v. TL.O. to support drug testing based on students' lowered
expectation of privacy. The Court's holding in Acton is the most
recent addition to the line of cases reducing the constitutional
rights of students.
C. Facts in Acton
In the mid-1980s, teachers and administrators in the Vernonia,
Oregon school district35 noticed an increase in drug use by
30. Id. at 1321.
31. Id. at 1319-20. The court of appeals distinguished loss of employment for failing a
drug test from suspension from participating in athletics. Id.
32. See New Jersey v. T.LO., 469 U.S. 325, 338-39 (1985). In T.L.O., the Court
examined whether the search of a student's purse, based on suspicion falling short of
probable cause, violated the Fourth Amendment. The Court determined that the protections
of the Fourth Amendment do extend to searches in a school setting. Id. at 336-37.
However, the school's interest in maintaining discipline was termed a "substantial" interest
and outweighed any intrusion caused by the search. Id. at 341.
Based on these factors, the Court crafted a two-part inquiry to assess the constitution-
ality of student searches: (1) the search must be "justified at its inception" by the existence
of "reasonable grounds for suspecting the search will turn up evidence that the student has
violated or is violating either the law or the rules of the school," and (2) the search must be
reasonably tailored and as free from intrusiveness as possible. Id. at 342.
33. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651,675-76 (1977) (finding imposition of corporal
punishment on grade school students, without due process, was constitutional given the long
history of permitted use of corporal punishment in schools).
34. See Hazelwood Sch. Dist. v. Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. 260, 273 (1988) (permitting
censorship of student-written newspaper).
35. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1356. Vernonia is a town of nearly 3,000 residents when
small surrounding communities are included. Id. The Vernonia school district includes a
grade school and a high school. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1516.
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students and a coincident rise in disciplinary problems. The school
district determined that the increase in disciplinary problems was
traceable to the increased drug use. As a result, the district
implemented various programs to attempt to combat drug use.36
After these drug programs proved unsuccessful, the school district
effectuated a random drug testing program for all students who
participated in interscholastic athletics.
37
Under the random drug testing program, all student-athletes
were tested prior to the athletic season and at random during the
season on a weekly basis.3" The urinalysis test detected the
36. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1356-57. The school district tried drug education classes,
seminars and speakers to no avail. Id. The school district also temporarily and unsuccessful-
ly employed a drug-sniffing dog. Id. at 1357.
37. Id. at 1358. Students wishing to participate in interscholastic athletics were first
required to sign a consent form authorizing drug testing. Id.
38. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1358. The district court describes the procedure of specimen
collection under Vemonia's program in great detail. The court explained:
The names of all students participating in sports during that season are
placed in a "pool" and approximately ten percent of the names are drawn from
the "pool" each week. A student draws numbers representing names from the
"pool," but is not aware of the names he or she draws. Students whose numbers
are drawn are tested one at a time throughout the day.
The procedure for the test varies slightly for boys and girls. Boys begin the
process by filling out of a portion of a specimen control form which assigns the
student a number. The student is then given a testing packet which contains a cup
and a vial. The student enters an empty locker room with a male school official
acting as a monitor. . . . The student then proceeds to a urinal to produce the
sample. While producing the sample, the student remains fully clothed and has
his back to the monitor. The monitor is present to assure that there is no
tampering and remains 12 to 15 feet behind the student.
The procedure for girls differs only in that a female school official acts as
a monitor and the sample is produced in an enclosed stall with a toilet. The
monitor remains outside the stall and listens for signs of tampering.
The samples are sent for testing to [a lab] under security procedures
designed to protect the chain of possession. [The lab] technicians do not know the
identity of the person being tested and rely solely upon the assigned numbers for
identification.... Test results are reported by telephone to authorized Vernonia
School District personnel. Positive results are also mailed to the district
superintendent.
If a student's test is positive, a second test will be administered as soon as
possible to confirm the results. . . .If the second test is negative, no further action
will be taken. If the second test is positive, the school notifies the parents or
guardians and conducts a hearing with the student and his or her parents. At this
hearing, the student will be given the option of either participating in an assistance
program and taking the weekly drug test for six weeks or suspension from the
athletic program for the remainder of the current season and the next athletic
season.
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presence of amphetamines, cocaine, marijuana and alcohol in the
urine.3 9 Any student-athlete who failed the test was suspended
from participating in interscholastic athletics.'
In 1991, James Acton, a seventh grader, decided to try out for
the grade school football team. However, James refused to sign
the random testing consent form, and the school district denied
James the opportunity to play football. James responded to this
ineligibility by bringing suit in the United States District Court for
the District of Oregon seeking declaratory and injunctive relief
from the random program.41
D. The District Court and Ninth Circuit's Rulings
Ruling in the school district's favor, the district court made the
following findings: the school district was beset by disciplinary
problems caused by increased drug use by students; other methods
of combatting drug use had failed; the schools' athletes were
viewed as role models in the small community;42 and, drug testing
these role models would and did have a deterrent effect on drug
use by others.43 The court stated that "[n]o evidence was present-
ed that refuted any of the facts set forth nor the conclusions
reached by school officials.""
The court concluded that Vernonia's program would be
constitutional under the Fourth Amendment only if the government
evinced a "compelling need" to test the student-athlete that out-
weighed the intrusion on the individual's privacy. 5 The court
Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1358-59.
39. Id. at 1359.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 1356, 1359.
42. As the district court stated: "The entertainment opportunities in Vernonia are fairly
limited so that interscholastic athletics play a dominant role in the community and student
athletes are well known and admired." Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1356; see Schaill v. Tippecan-
oe County Sch. Corp., 864 F.2d 1309, 1320-21 (7th Cir. 1988)(terming high school student-
athletes a "widely admired" group). In Schaill, the Seventh Circuit stated: "This court may
take judicial notice of the fact that in society at large drug usage by athletes is highly
publicized and is a matter of great concern... [and] is likely to affect the behavior of others.
.." Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1320-21. Compare Courting Controversy, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED,
July 10, 1995, at 11 (questioning why athletes are singled out for testing).
43. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1356-57, 1368. The school district asserted that discipline
normalized and there were no athletic injuries attributable to drug use following the
implementation of the random drug testing program. Id. at 1368.
44. Id. at 1357.
45. Id. at 1360. The district court stated that this test was unannounced, but reflected
the Supreme Court's clear intention that probable cause was not a requirement in all non-
1995]
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decided that this test essentially was an inquiry into the program's
reasonableness under the Fourth Amendment.'
The district court employed a four-prong test developed in
State v. Tourtillott,47 to examine the Vernonia testing program. To
test stops at random checkpoints under the Oregon Constitution,
the Oregon Supreme Court in State v. Tourtillott utilized the
following four factors in a balancing test: (1) the significance of the
government's interest; (2) the "psychologically and physically
intrusive nature of the" stop; (3) the stop's efficacy; and (4) the
discretion the stop affords government agents. 4 Applying the
Tourtillott test, the district court found in favor of the Vernonia
school district on all four factors.
The district court found the government's compelling need,
articulated broadly as the deterrence of drug use in Vernonia's
schools, existed based on testimony regarding the worsening
discipline problem and the logical inference that drug use caused
the problem.49 Swayed by the one-sided evidence before it, the
district court determined that Vernonia's program was "justified at
its inception" and was borne out to be effective by a subsequent
decrease in discipline problems.'
The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court,51 holding that
Vernonia's testing program violated James Acton's rights under the
Oregon Constitution, and by implication, the Fourth Amend-
criminal searches. Id.
46. The court noted that the program would also be assessed under the Oregon
Constitution using the Fourth Amendment's reasonableness inquiry.
The Fourth Amendment specifically forbids "unreasonable" searches. U.S. CONST.
amend. IV. Criminal searches that are unsupported by a warrant issued upon probable cause
or searches that are not authorized by a judicially-created exception to the warrant/probable
cause requirement are held to be per se unreasonable. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
357 (1967). In the non-criminal search context, courts apply a variety of balancing tests,
weighing in broad strokes the need for the search against the individual's privacy rights and
the search's intrusion thereon. See generally Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 668; Skinner, 489 U.S.
at 632-33 (Both Von Raab and Skinner applied balancing tests in non-criminal contexts.).
47. 618 P.2d 423 (Or. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 972 (1981).
48. See id. at 433. The Oregon Supreme Court acknowledged that its test only applied
to the constitutionality of a stop as opposed to a search. Id. at 434. The Tourtillott test is
derived from a reasonable interpretation of the Supreme Court's balancing test in Delaware
v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979). Tourtillott, 618 P.2d at 433.
49. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1363. The court determined that protecting "student safety
in athletic programs" was another compelling interest behind Vemonia's program. Id.
50. Id. at 1365, 1368.
51. Acton, 23 F.3d 1514 (9th Cir. 1994).
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ment. 2 However, due to the lack of relevant Oregon law relating
to random drug testing, the Ninth Circuit was constrained to apply
Fourth Amendment concepts as well as Oregon cases involving
other types of searches.53
The Ninth Circuit applied the same four factor test as the
district court to assess the constitutionality of the Vernonia
program under the Oregon Constitution.' But, while the district
court in Acton found that each of the four Tourtillott factors
weighed in favor of drug testing, the Ninth Circuit determined that
the Tourtillott factors weighed in favor of James Acton's privacy
rights.
The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that Vernonia's
program was effective and that the random nature of the program
removed any discretion from the school officials regarding which
students to test." However, on the dispositive issues of the
government's interest and the intrusiveness of the testing pro-
gram, 6 the Ninth Circuit found in favor of James Acton. The
Court of Appeals first pointed out that drug testing previously had
been justified only to serve important government interests when
the public's safety was clearly at risk. The court felt that this broad
interest was not impinged by the Vernonia situation. Further-
52. Although the Ninth Circuit decided the case on the basis of the Oregon Constitu-
tion, the provisions against illegal searches and seizures in Oregon were determined to be
at least coextensive with the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 1518-19.
53. Id. at 1523.
54. Compare Acton, 23 F.3d at 1521 with Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1366. The Ninth Circuit
stated that the Tourtillot test was probably formulated using Fourth Amendment concepts
and may not represent the extent of protections under the Oregon Constitution. Acton, 23
F.3d at 1521.
55. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1522. The Ninth Circuit stated that evidence demonstrating
testing's efficiency was based solely on the testimony of teachers and school officials and thus
this factor weighed only slightly in favor of Vemonia. Id.
56. Id. The court of appeals stated: "That leaves importance and intrusiveness. In this
case, they are dispositive. They dispose of the Policy." Id. The district court had apparently
disagreed, finding that Vernonia's program was the least intrusive method possible in part
because direct observation was merely optional and Vernonia's interests in deterring drug
use were deemed to be "highly significant." Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1367-68.
57. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1524, The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted that the Von
Raab Court only permitted testing of "frontline and gun-toting workers," not all employees
of the Customs Department. The Ninth Circuit distinguished drug testing employees in
sensitive areas or those entrusted with the public safety from testing young student-athletes.
The appeals court duly noted that lives were not at stake in Vemonia's athletic program.
1995]
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more, the Ninth Circuit found that the student-athletes' expecta-
tions of privacy were not diminished and remained vital.58
III. Narrative Analysis
A. The Supreme Court's Holding in Acton
In Acton, the Supreme Court, by a 6 to 3 majority, ruled that
the Vemonia School District's drug testing program did not violate
the Fourth Amendment.59 Justice Scalia drafted the majority
opinion and was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
Thomas, Kennedy, Breyer and Ginsburg.6° Justice O'Connor
dissented and was joined by Justices Stevens and Souter.61
The Court disagreed with the Ninth Circuit as to the relative
sparseness and effect of the district court's findings. 62  Justice
Scalia accorded the district court's findings of fact significant
weight, despite the apparent transparency of the school district's
evidence. First, Justice Scalia accepted the school district's
unsubstantiated assertions that the student-athletes were "leaders
of the drug culture."'63 Second, Justice Scalia stated that, as a
matter of common sense, it is very likely that drug use imperils
58. The appeals court found that the additional rules and requirements placed upon
student-athletes did not compel a finding that they were "pervasively regulated." Acton, 23
F.3d at 1525. The court stated, "Normal locker room or restroom activities are a far cry
from having an authority figure watch, listen to, and gather the results of one's urination."
Id.
59. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396. The Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit for a
ruling based solely on the protections afforded James Acton under the Oregon Constitution.
Id. at 2397. The potential impact of the Court's remand is discussed infra at notes 81-83 and
accompanying text.
60. Justice Ginsburg concurred in the majority opinion and added that she did not view
the majority as allowing random drug testing of all students. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397
(Ginsburg, J., concurring).
61. Justice O'Connor dissented primarily on the ground that the majority's opinion
authorized suspicionless testing which was a substantial departure from the Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence. Id. at 2398 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
62. The Ninth Circuit was emphatic when it reviewed the district court's findings:
However, we reemphasize that what the evidence shows, and all it shows, is that
there was some drug usage in the schools, that student discipline had declined, that
athletes were involved, and that there was reason to believe that one athlete
suffered an injury because of drug usage and others may have.
Acton, 23 F.3d at 1519.
63. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2389.
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athletic safety.' Third, the Court believed that "[d]isciplinary
problems had reached epidemic proportions," and the student
"rebellion" was being fueled by alcohol and drug abuse.65 Fourth,
Justice Scalia emphasized that while the drug tests can be moni-
tored, the monitors often do not watch the test taker.
With these findings as its basis, the Court assessed the
Vernonia drug tests under the Fourth Amendment's broad
reasonableness inquiry. In so doing, the Court confirmed the Ninth
Circuit's assessment of drug testing athletes under a reasonableness
standard, stating that school drug testing fell into the "special
needs" exception66 for searches that do not require the issuance
of a warrant supported by probable cause.67 Under the Fourth
Amendment reasonableness inquiry, the Court weighs the degree
of testing's intrusiveness against the nature and importance of the
privacy right that is assailed, and also against the importance of the
64. Justice Scalia, however, ignored the fact that the connection between drug use by
and consequent injury to drug-using Vernonia athletes rests solely on the unsubstantiated
assertion by one high school coach who believed that one wrestler injured his ribs after using
marijuana. The district court stated that the coach testified "that suspected drug use
contributed to the injury of a wrestler who failed to execute a basic maneuver." Acton, 796
F. Supp. at 1357 (emphasis added). The district court later extended the coach's testimony
and stated that there "was evidence in the record of specific instances in which coaches have
observed athletes perform poorly and unsafely while under the influence of some intoxicant."
Id. at 1363 (emphasis added). The record is in fact devoid of any such evidence beyond the
wrestling coach's simplistic and flawed logic.
65. The district court's rhetoric and the Supreme Court's acceptance of it raises two
questions: First, are the district court's findings simply a product of a generation gap in which
the act of wearing a tie-dyed t-shirt is (mis)interpreted as a badge of drug use? The Ninth
Circuit acknowledged that the district court's findings were based on perceptions not facts.
Acton, 23 F.3d at 1519.
Second, if problems at schools in Vernonia, Oregon, a community of some 3,000
people, were thought to have reached epidemic proportions, how should we characterize
conditions in larger, urban schools? Both the district court and the Ninth Circuit acknowl-
edged that "[w]hat appears to be a problem in one place might seem to be a minor
annoyance elsewhere." Acton, 23 F.3d at 1519; see Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1364-65
(recognizing that Vernonia's program may not be justified in other larger communities).
66. The Supreme Court created an exception to the Fourth Amendment's war-
rant/probable cause requirement "when special needs, beyond the normal need for law
enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impracticable." Griffin v.
Wisconsin, 483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)(citation omitted). The Skinner Court decided that drug
testing railway workers following a serious train accident fit into the "special needs"
exception because the evidence sought was perishable. Skinner, 489 U.S. 602, 620 (1989).
67. The California and Colorado Supreme Courts reached the same conclusions in
assessing college drug testing programs. See Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994) (finding
random drug testing fit within "special needs" exception); University of Colo. v. Derdeyn,
863 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1646 (1994).
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government interest that is served by the testing.' Finally, the
Court measures whether feasible, equally effective, but less
intrusive alternatives exist.
B. The Court's View of the Privacy Rights Enjoyed by Student-
Athletes
The Court determined that the privacy rights of the Vernonia
student-athletes were virtually nonexistent. The Court reasoned
that schoolchildren, while not completely devoid of privacy rights,
are subject to reduced expectations of privacy. Justice Scalia stated
that location, as much as any other factor, determines the scope of
an established privacy right. Thus, privacy rights are clearly
reduced in public places such as "in a car, or in a public park."69
Justice Scalia also considered that schoolchildren are in the State's
custodial care as a factor which tended to diminish the scope of an
established privacy right.7"
In addition, Justice Scalia reasoned that because student-
athletes participate in interscholastic athletics in an environment
akin to a "closely regulated industry," they have diminished
expectations of privacy.7" Justice Scalia also explicitly accepted
the "communal undress" reasoning first expressed in Schaill, stating
that because athletes must change their clothes and shower in a
public area, they are further divested of their right to complete
privacy.
72
C. Intrusiveness of the Drug Tests
The Court also determined that Vernonia's drug tests are not
particularly invasive. Justice Scalia emphasized that direct monitor-
ing is rarely employed by school monitors: boys naturally have
their backs to monitors while testing and monitors rarely make an
68. The Skinner Court stated that the privacy right impinged by drug testing was the
individual's "excretory function." Skinner, 489 U.S. at 626. The Court has stated that this
right was generally accorded great protection. Id.; see also Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1318.
69. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2391. Public schools qualify as public places.
70. Justice Scalia noted that the school stands in loco parentis to its students and enjoys
considerable custodial leeway. Id. at 2391-92.
71. Justice Scalia pointed out that student-athletes are required to submit to medical
examinations, must achieve a certain grade point average and are subject to various other
rules and regulations not applicable to non-athlete students. Id. at 2393.
72. Id. at 2392-93.
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effort to observe.73 In addition, the Court stressed that only
limited disclosure of test results to selected officials occurred.
Thus, the majority concluded that there was "negligible" invasive-
ness in the process of specimen collection.74
Finally, Justice Scalia rejected Acton's arguments that testing
forced the disclosure of a student-athlete's use of medications to
school district officials prior to taking a drug test to avoid a false
positive, by emphasizing that distribution of the test results to only
a few selected school officials militated against Acton's argu-
ment." Justice Scalia indicated that no aspect or announced rule
of the drug testing program prevented a student from enclosing
medications in a sealed envelope to school district officials.
However, this conclusion ignores the fact that a positive test will
require the eventual disclosure of the private medical information
to a school district official. At that point, a student athlete's use of
contraceptives or pregnancy medication will be revealed. That
information is often critically private to young individuals.
Disclosure to anyone other than that individual's doctor could have
serious societal ramifications.76
D. Government Interest and the Efficacy of the Drug Tests as the
Means Employed To Meet the Government Interest
Whereas both the district court and the Ninth Circuit required
the government to demonstrate a compelling need to test for drugs,
the Supreme Court applied a lesser standard, stating that the
government's interest must only be sufficiently important to justify
testing.77 The Court found that the government's interest was
73. Id. at 2389. The Court steadfastly maintained that monitors are present during
testing, only to ensure that no "tampering" with the specimen occurs. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at
2393; see supra note 38.
74. Id. at 2393.
75. The Court's assertion that students must first disclose the use of prescription
medications prior to taking the drug test is the first published mention of this aspect of the
Vernonia program. See id. at 2389. The disclosure of medication argument was either not
raised below or was ineffectually raised.
76. For example, it is not hard to imagine that a sexually active teenage female would
be inhibited from using birth control pills if she feared her use of those pills could be
disclosed to her parents and teachers.
77. Id. at 2394. The Supreme Court majority chastised the Ninth Circuit for requiring
Vernonia to demonstrate a compelling interest. In Justice Scalia's view, courts are required
to determine the significance of the government's interest only "in light of other factors
which show the search to be relatively intrusive upon a genuine expectation of privacy." Id.
at 2394-95. Left undetermined is what quantum of government interest will suffice when the
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important and nearly compelling; it was certainly sufficiently
important to justify limited intrusions on the weakened privacy
rights possessed by student-athletes. 8 The Court determined that
drug testing student-athletes was effective and satisfied both the
role model and injury prevention goals.79 The Court reiterated
that only feasible alternatives will be considered and that no
requirement exists that the test be the least intrusive method.'
E. No Hope in the Remand
The Supreme Court remanded the case to the Ninth Circuit
because the appeals court did not consider whether testing would
violate student athletes' right to privacy under the Oregon
Constitution."t The Ninth Circuit had concluded that the protect-
ions afforded under the Oregon Constitution are at least coexten-
sive with the Fourth Amendment. Thus, the court's finding that
Vernonia's program violated the Fourth Amendment preempted an
extensive inquiry into protections under the Oregon Constitution.
On remand, the Ninth Circuit in a brief 2 to 1 opinion held
that the Oregon Constitution's protections were not greater than
those provided for in the United States Constitution. 2 The Ninth
Circuit did not elaborate on how it reached its terse conclusion. 3
Justice Reinhardt dissented and pointed out that the Ninth Circuit
had made an abrupt about-face that conflicted with its 1994
opinion. 4
other factors favoring testing are weak.
78. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2394. The discipline crisis was also thought to require
immediate attention. Id.
79. Id. at 2394-95. Testimony in the record as to improved discipline no doubt
compelled this conclusion.
80. The Actons argued that suspicion-based testing was a superior method of testing and
reduced the intrusiveness of testing. The Court, however, believed that suspicion-based
testing would lead to a host of evils, including transforming testing into a "badge of shame."
Id. at 2396.
81. Id. at 2397.
82. Acton v. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J, 66 F.3d 217,218 (9th Cir. 1995). The court refused
to certify the question to the Oregon Supreme Court. Id. at n.1.
The Ninth Circuit had previously stated, "Nonetheless, Oregon insists that its
constitutional provision can give more protection than the federal constitution and that it
sometimes does." Id. at 217. In fact, the Ninth Circuit concluded previously that "[i]t is
highly likely that it [Oregon Constitution] will be found to offer more protection" than the
Fourth Amendment. Id.
83. Id. at 218.
84. Acton, 66 F.3d at 218 (Reinhardt, J., dissenting). Justice Reinhardt stated: "The
majority's inexplicable willingness to certify the question and its rash, peremptory conclusion
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F Justice O'Connor's Dissent
Justice O'Connor dissented on the ground that the Acton
majority dispensed with the element of individualized suspicion in
authorizing random drug testing.85 Justice O'Connor asserted that
the majority's position that blanket searches are less intrusive or
more constitutional than searches of individuals selected on the
basis of suspicion was flawed. Justice O'Connor rested this
assertion on the proposition that suspicion is a necessary precondi-
tion to all searches, unless it would be impracticable to demonstrate
the validity or existence of suspicion.86 The notion that schools no
longer need to require suspicion prior to searching its student-
athletes was particularly galling to the dissent because each
previous search case involving schools contained at least some
element of suspicion.8
Justice O'Connor was troubled by the lack of factual findings
justifying testing in the Vernonia grade school as opposed to the
high school.88 In addition, Justice O'Connor was struck by the
that the Oregon Constitution affords no greater protection than does the Fourth Amendment
.. * stands in direct contradiction to our prior opinion - more specifically to the part that
was not overruled by the Supreme Court." Id. Justice Reinhardt continued: "The majority
cites no intervening Oregon case law to explain its swift and total capitulation on this issue
nor does it explain what, if any, reasoning underlies its conclusion." Id. at 219. Justice
Reinhardt thought the best course of action was to certify the question to the Oregon
Supreme Court. Id. at 220.
85. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2397-98 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor noted that
"[flor most of our constitutional history, mass, suspicionless searches have been generally
considered per se unreasonable within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. And we
have allowed exceptions in recent years only where it has been clear that a suspicion-based
regime would be ineffectual." Id. at 2398.
86. Justice O'Connor explained that cases permitting suspicionless searches under the
"special needs" exception involved chaos or urgency and a reasonable fear that the evidence
would dissipate while a warrant was being secured. Id. at 2401 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
Justice O'Connor distinguished Skinner, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), from the situation presented
in the Acton case on the grounds that a post-train accident scene is chaotic. The railway
workers in Skinner were only tested following a train wreck, thus the search in Skinner was
implicitly based on at least a modicum of individualized suspicion. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2401
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
87. Notwithstanding the Court's statement in TL.O. that individualized suspicion is not
an "irreducible element," the search conducted in T.L.O. was based on some level of
suspicion. New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 341 n.7 (1985). Moreover, the test the Court
formulated in T.L.O. requires that the school officials have some level of suspicion prior to
undertaking a search. Id. at 342.
88. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2406 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor accepted
arguendo that Vernonia presented sufficient evidence with respect to the need to test its high
school student-athletes. Id.
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absence of findings justifying testing of student-athletes as opposed
to another segment of the student population.89 The dissent
concluded that Vernonia should only test students based on
individualized suspicion. The suspicion, however, does not have to
rise to the level of probable cause.
IV. Difficulties with the Court's Holding in Acton
A. Findings
Justice Scalia asserted that more evidence of drug use was
produced in Acton to support a need for drug testing than in Von
Raab." Justice Scalia's statement lacks credibility because no
documented evidence of drug use by student-athletes exists in
Acton.9" In Von Raab, both Justice Scalia and Justice Stevens
dissented from the majority's opinion because they found no
evidence to support testing of all Customs Service employees.92
Thus, Justice Scalia's opinion in Acton was a significant departure
from his dissent in Von Raab.93
89. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting). The dissent noted that the real purpose behind the
Vernonia program was to improve discipline in the schools. However, Vernonia failed to
present sufficient evidence that the student-athletes were the root cause of the worsening
discipline situation. Id. (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
90. Id. at 2396. In Von Raab, the Customs Service did not produce evidence of a single
incident of drug use. The testing of Customs employees revealed that only a small number
of employees failed the drug test. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 683 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
91. The Court could have found that the district court's findings were clear error under
FED. R. Clv. P. 52(a). Even findings which are made wholly on the basis of one party's
evidence, as in Acton, can be rejected by an appeals court. United States v. United States
Gypsum Co., 333 U.S. 364, 395 (1948).
92. Compare Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 683 (Scalia, J., dissenting) with Skinner, 489 U.S.
at 607 (The railway agency in Skinner presented evidence of at least 21 accidents involving
impairment.). Justice Scalia stated in his dissenting opinion in Von Raab that he only joined
in Skinner because there was extensive evidence of drug use by railroad employees and
consequent harm from such drug use that was utterly lacking in Von Raab. Von Raab, 489
U.S. at 680 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Ironically, Justice Scalia indicated in his Von Raab dissent
that he felt that the Fourth Amendment was being reduced to meaningless surplusage by the
increase of suspicionless testing. Id. at 680-81, 684 (Scalia, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Fourth
Amendment has become frail protection indeed.").
93. Justice Scalia's position is even more remarkable given the utter lack of anything
more than circumstantial evidence justifying the need for testing in Acton. In Acton, Justice
Scalia should have heeded his wisdom in his Von Raab dissent, in which he stated:
"I decline to join the Court's opinion in the present case because neither frequency of use
nor connection to harm is demonstrated or even likely. In my view the Customs Service
rules are a kind of immolation of privacy and human dignity in symbolic opposition to drug
use." Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 681 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The district court's findings in Acton mirror the testimony of
the school district's witnesses. The court stated that the Actons
presented no evidence refuting the school district's assertions of
student drug use.94 However, what the district court ignored is
that the Actons were not challenging the legitimacy of the school
district's concerns, which spurred the implementation of the drug
tests; the Actons were only challenging Vernonia's chosen method
of fighting the drug problem. 9 Thus, the court should not have
expected, nor required the Actons to present evidence that pointed
out the sparse and highly circumstantial nature of the school
district's evidence.96 Consequently, the Supreme Court was left not
with the cold and unimpassioned decisions of a trier of fact drawing
conclusions from conflicting testimony, but with a judge who
adopted the rhetoric of the school district. Words such as "epidem-
ic" 97 and "rebellion"98 clearly indicate that the trial court judge
accepted Vernonia's rhetoric.
Moreover, testimony by the school district's witnesses only
established perceived increases in drug use by students in general;
it did not establish an increase in drug use by athletes in particu-
lar.99 Notably absent from the school district's evidence is any
hard, empirical evidence of drug use by athletes specifically or by
students generally."°
However, Justice Scalia did presage his opinion in Acton when he stated in Von Raab
that social necessity, such as maintaining school discipline in the face of worsening drug use,
may justify drug testing. Id. (Scalia, J., dissenting).
94. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1364.
95. On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the Actons raised two arguments with regard to the
sparse evidence: (1) the school district failed to establish that there was a drug problem in
Vernonia, and (2) "even if there were a drug problem, it did not justify a random testing
program." Acton, 23 F.3d at 1518. The Ninth Circuit stated that it only agreed with the
Actons' second argument, but the appeals court later emphasized that the school district did
not present sufficient evidence justifying testing of its athletes. Id.
96. The Actons also belatedly argued on appeal that much of what the school district
introduced at trial was inadmissible hearsay.
97. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1357.
98. Id.
99. See id. at 1356.
100. For instance, the school district at one time employed a drug-sniffing dog, yet the
school district never divulged the results of the canine's employment.
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B. The Mythical Justification of Random Drug Testing -
Preventing Athletic Injuries Caused by Drug Use
The district court stated that one of the original purposes of
Vernonia's testing program was to reduce athletic injuries caused
by drug use.'0 1 All drug testing of student-athletes rests on the
proposition that drug problems exist among student-athletes (even
on a nationwide basis) and that random drug testing is necessary to
prevent athletic injuries by drug-impaired athletes. However, these
propositions rest on virtually no empirical evidence." 2 For exam-
ple, drug testing by the NCAA reveals virtually no drug use among
its student-athletes. 3
Furthermore, since traditional drug tests do not reveal steroid
use, the Vernonia tests are not designed to detect the use of
anabolic steroids. As a result, the school district's program failed
to test for a category of drugs that are more frequently used and
are arguably more dangerous to an athlete's health than drugs such
as cocaine or marijuana. It is hypocritical for Vernonia to justify
its testing of student-athletes on the basis of preventing athletic
101. However, the court relied primarily on the role model goal, largely because the
athletic safety exception would likely collapse on the foundation of lack of evidence.
102. For instance, the high school principal in Brooks v. East Chambers Consolidated
Independent School District, 730 F. Supp. 759, 761 (S.D. Tex. 1989), afftd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th
Cir. 1991), stated that he had no evidence of any athletic injury resulting from drug use.
Drug use among high school students clearly exists in substantial numbers. See Abigail
Trafford, Winners & Losers; A Look at the Past Ten Years, WASH. POST, Jan. 3, 1995, at 01
("Federal statistics released in December showed no significant decline in the use of any
illicit drug among high school students, and increases in many categories."); see also infra
note 122. However, there is no evidence to date demonstrating: (1) athletes are more prone
to use drugs or use drugs in numbers approaching the national average for all students, or
(2) that a substantial number of athletes have been injured due to drug use.
While it is obvious that drug use must impair athletic performance and very likely
could cause injuries to impaired athletes, evidence of injuries to drug-impaired athletes is
nonexistent.
103. See generally NATIONAL COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS'N, 1986-1987 DRUG TESTING
PROGRAM (1986) [hereinafter NCAA 1986-1987 PROGRAM]. In 1986, the National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) implemented a random drug-testing program.
Student-athletes who tested positive in a urine test for drugs banned by the NCAA lost their
eligibility to participate in intercollegiate athletics.
In 1987, twenty-four players were suspended from NCAA Division I football games
for failing NCAA drug tests. Douglas Lederman, 32 Football Players Failed NCAA Drug
Tests Last Fall, CHRON. HIGHER EDUC., Mar. 16, 1988, at A39. In 1988, only four players
were banned for failing drug tests. Id. From January 1992 to June 1992, one-half of one
percent of all tested NCAA athletes failed drug tests. Very Few Athletes Fail Drug-Testing
Program, NCAA NEWS, Sept. 2, 1992, at 6.
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injuries when it fails to effectively test these athletes. Moreover,
limiting testing to interscholastic athletics participants does not
reduce the risk of injury to other vulnerable "student-athletes,"
such as participants in recreational athletics on school grounds or
in physical education programs. If the school district's purpose is
to prevent athletic injuries caused by drug use, it must first present
credible evidence that student athletes use drugs and are imperiled,
and then must implement testing that effectively prevents athletic
injuries.
C. Rights of Schoolchildren After Acton
While never vitally strong, students' constitutional rights are
further reduced by the Court's holding in Acton. The Supreme
Court has stated that students do not "shed their constitutional
rights ... at the schoolhouse gate."" However, the Acton Court
believes that the constitutional rights afforded to schoolchildren are
"what is appropriate for children in school."1 5 The Court fails
to elaborate as to "what is appropriate for children in school,"
thereby granting virtually unbridled discretion to teachers and
administrators to determine the extent of students' constitutional
rights.
Against this legal backdrop, schools and school boards across
the United States are now faced with the decision of whether they
should implement their own versions of the Vernonia drug testing
program. Although drug testing may be an overrated method of
preventing the use of drugs, it can be a solution in areas besieged
by drug use. However, notwithstanding the Court's holding in
Acton, a school first should consider the privacy ramifications of
drug testing before implementing such a program. t°6
104. Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969). In
Tinker, the Court found that a school's ban on wearing armbands to school violated the First
Amendment.
105. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2392. The Court based its proposition that students have
diminished expectations of privacy on the fact that many states have compulsory school
attendance laws and teachers act in loco parentis to students. The Ninth Circuit, unlike the
Court, stated that the fact students are compelled to attend school does not equate to a
diminishment of a student's privacy expectations. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1525.
106. The district court noted that Vernonia first sought the advice of counsel before
implementing its program. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1358.
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V. Designing a Program That Satisfies Acton and Minimizes
Random Drug Testing's Invasiveness
Schools are much more likely to implement random drug
testing programs now that the apparent legal hurdles have been
lifted by the Supreme Court. t" In fact, many school districts
plagued by drug use have publicly welcomed the Court's decision
in Acton with open arms." However, random testing will still
invite legal challenges and entreaties to the Court to reconsider its
holding in Acton. By following several guidelines, schools can
minimize the intrusiveness of its drug testing program and decrease
the risks of litigation.
A. The Drug Testing Program Should Not Permit Direct Visual
Monitoring
Visual monitoring is the single most invasive physical act
associated with random drug testing," although testing is still
considered a search for Fourth Amendment purposes even if there
is no monitoring component. n ° The Actons argued that drug
testing was invasive, partly because the athletes could be directly
observed during the test."' While the Supreme Court held that
the Vernonia tests were not unconstitutionally invasive, the Court
emphasized that visual monitoring in the Vernonia program was
clearly optional and did not always occur.
107. Schools should be aware of the limits of the Acton Court's holding: (1) testing may
still be unconstitutional under state Constitutions, which may provide greater protection to
individual privacy than the Fourth Amendment; (2) the Acton holding does not authorize
random drug testing of all students; and (3) Acton may have little or no application to
college drug testing programs, especially in light of the Court's denial of certiorari in
University of Colorado v. Derdeyn, 863 P.2d 929 (Colo. 1993) (finding that the University
of Colorado's random drug testing procedure was unconstitutional under both the Fourth
Amendment and the Colorado Constitution), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 1646 (1994).
108. See School Kids Face More Drug Tests, MIAMI HERALD, June 27, 1995, at 1A, 4A
(reporting that Florida school districts in Dade and Broward Counties are considering the
use of random drug testing programs).
109. See Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1318 (finding lack of visual monitoring reduced tests'
invasiveness).
110. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1359 (finding testing was still a search because tests disclosed
extraneous, private medical information); see Brooks v. East Chambers Consolidated Indep.
Sch. Dist., 730 F. Supp. 759, 763 (S.D. Tex. 1989), affd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991).
111. The Ninth Circuit in Acton asserted that the monitors were unable to or did not
observe the act of urination, although they were present and in close proximity to the
athletes. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1516.
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The Supreme Court implicitly rejected the argument that
monitoring the Vernonia athletes was invasive, stating that student-
athletes had lessened expectations of privacy.112 The Court in-
voked the so-called "communal undress" reasoning, which provides
that athletes, by virtue of undressing and showering in a locker
room, lose a good portion of their right to privacy and certainly are
not offended by monitored urination. Yet the Court ignored the
distinction that nudity in a locker room among one's peers is not
monitored, nor is it compulsory."'
Other courts have also adopted the reduced invasiveness
formulation in connection with student-athletes.114 This reasoning
stems from the regulated industry exception in which the Court has
held that employees working in a "pervasively regulated industry"
are afforded reduced expectations of Fourth Amendment priva-
cy. 15  However, in Acton, the Ninth Circuit found that the type
of regulations to which athletes are subject do not compel a finding
that student-athletes operate in a "pervasively regulated" environ-
ment. 16  In light of the controversy surrounding direct visual
112. The district court only mentioned in passing the communal nature of the Vemonia
locker rooms. Acton, 796 F. Supp. at 1363.
113. The Ninth Circuit summarily rejected the "communal undress" argument. Acton,
23 F.3d at 1525; see Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633, 692 (Cal. 1994) (Mosk, J., dissenting)
(asserting that student athletes should not be more open to urine testing than non-athletes
just because they are regulated, supervised and function in a communal environment). The
"communal undress" reasoning is factually flawed and logically deficient. Is the unwarranted
strip search of an exotic dancer less invasive merely because the dancer is unclothed on
stage? Of course not. The Court fails to recognize that people are able to compartmentalize
aspects of their lives, thus changing clothes in front of one's peers is vastly different than
being carefully observed by an authority figure while providing a urine specimen.
114. See, e.g., Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1318-19 (stating that because student-athletes are in the
public eye more than non-athletes, it is implausible for student-athletes to have a strong
expectation of privacy as to a urine test); Hill v. NCAA, 865 P.2d 633 (Cal. 1994) (asserting
that student-athletes have a reduced expectation of personal privacy in their bodily
conditions because of the unique set of demands that athletic participation carries with it).
115. See Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 672 (finding firearm-bearing customs agents "reasonably
should expect effective inquiry into their fitness and probity"); Skinner, 489 U.S. at 627-28
(noting railroad workers work in pervasively regulated and monitored industry); New York
v. Burger, 482 U.S.. 691, 699-703 (1987) (noting junkyard dealers operate in pervasively
regulated industry); Donovan v. Dewey, 452 U.S. 594, 602 (1981) (mine workers); United
States v. Biswell, 406 U.S. 311, 315 (1972) (firearm dealers); Colonnade Catering Corp. v.
United States, 397 U.S. 72, 76 (1970) (finding liquor business is licensed and subject to
extensive regulation). The Von Raab Court identified the United States Mint as a
quintessential "pervasively regulated industry," whose employees should expect to be validly
searched at the end of each business day. Von Raab, 489 U.S. at 671.
116. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1525 (noting that student-athletes do not face extensive regulation
or background checks). The appeals court concluded that "[a]thletes' right to privacy []
1995]
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monitoring of student-athletes, schools implementing drug programs
would be wise to prohibit or keep to a minimum any direct visual
monitoring of students' urination.
B. Individualized Suspicion Should Be a Component of Any
Random Drug Testing Program
The Ninth Circuit stated that a program based on individual-
ized suspicion would probably be a more effective deterrent of drug
use than Vemonia's random program. 7  The Ninth Circuit
recognized, however, that suspicion-based programs are also subject
to problems.'
8
Opponents of suspicion-based programs paint an effective
picture of the problems inherent in suspicion-based testing: it
creates an additional burden for administrators and teachers;1 9
it exposes teachers and school officials to defamation and discrimi-
nation suits; it places too much discretion in the hands of school
officials with respect to the decision of which students to test;
teachers are unfamiliar with the dictates of the Fourth Amendment
and probable cause requirements;120 and, the results of suspicion-
based tests are largely punitive, thereby transforming teachers into
adjunct law enforcement officials.'' However, a testing program
built around the requirement of a showing of individualized
suspicion would survive even Justice O'Connor's sharp inquiry.
Testing student-athletes rests on the flawed assumption that
athletes are more likely to use drugs than other segments of the
Student population. Yet, the demands on an athlete's time and
body make it unlikely that an athlete is more likely to use drugs
than another student. The publicized instances of drug use among
athletes erroneously magnify the amount of drug use by ath-
remains robust." Id.
117. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1522.
118. Id. The appeals court found that a suspicion-based program would increase
discretion and would be subject to risks and abuses.
119. See Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2396.
120. See, e.g., New Jersey v. T.L.O., 469 U.S. 325, 343 (1985); Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1314.
121. Justice O'Connor noted that teachers already act in an investigatory capacity.
Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2402-03. (O'Connor, J., dissenting) (pointing to number of discipline
categories teachers are charged with overseeing). Because teachers are charged with
maintaining discipline, they often act as both police officer and judge when meting out
punishment.
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letes.t2  It is curious that, for instance, musicians are stereo-
typically more likely to use drugs, yet they are not selected for
testing."3
School administrators clearly view testing student-athletes as
a stepping stone to global testing despite legal precedent to the
contrary124 Although testing of entire student bodies is not
permitted or envisioned under the majority's opinion in Acton, a
testing program based on individualized suspicion would expose all
student drug users to potential testing.
C Schools Should Only Use Narrowly Designed Tests
Another invasive feature of any drug testing program is that
the tests reveal medical facts beyond illicit drug use. For instance,
drug tests reveal the use of contraceptives or a pregnancy medica-
tion." Although the Actons, as well as other plaintiffs, have
challenged this aspect of the tests, the exposure of private medical
122. Random drug tests conducted by the NCAA reveal that only a small percentage of
tested athletes use drugs. See, e.g., Very Few Athletes Fail Drug-Testing Program, NCAA
NEWS, Sept. 2, 1992, at 6 (reporting that only one-half of one percent of all athletes during
six month period failed NCAA drug tests). This number is far less than the average use by
the general student population. For example, statistics gathered in Arizona showed that
among the high school students polled, 44.4% had tried marijuana and 11% had tried
cocaine. That's a Fact, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Jan. 25, 1995, at 1.
123. Instances of drug use and abuse by popular musicians is legendary. It is important
to note that the two justifications for testing student-athletes, if substantiated, are unique to
student-athletes. See Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1319. The Seventh Circuit stated that testing
athletes does not imply that testing of other students is permissible.
124. See School Kids Face More Drug Tests, MIAMI HERALD, June 27, 1995, at 4A. The
deputy general counsel for the National School Boards Association stated that, after Acton,
testing could be expanded to include students participating in other school-sponsored
activities. Id. Counsel for Vemonia viewed Acton as permitting testing of all students when
teachers were confronted with a drug "crisis" such as that which faced the Vemonia school
district. Id.
However, the court in Brooks v. East Chambers Consolidated Independent School
District, 730 F. Supp. 759, 766 (S.D.Tex. 1989), affd, 930 F.2d 915 (5th Cir. 1991),
emphatically rejected testing of all students as a clear violation of the Fourth Amendment.
See, e.g., Anable v. Ford, 653 F. Supp. 22 (W.D.Ark. 1985); Odenheim v. Carlstadt-East
Rutherford Regional Sch. Dist., 510 A.2d 709 (N.J. Super. 1985). Even the Vernonia
principal recognized that a global testing program was of questionable legality and stated that
Vemonia scrapped a planned global program because "we were afraid we'd be sued to hell
if we went to all students." School Kids Face More Drug Tests, supra at 4A (quoting Randall
Aultman).
125. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 617; Jones v. McKenzie, 833 F.2d 335, 339 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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facts has never constituted the basis of a court's ruling invalidating
drug testing.1 26
Whether tests can be designed that only reveal the presence of
illegal drugs is a question best left to scientists. Certainly, the
random tests should be designed to reveal only the use of illegal or
dangerous narcotics.
D. Schools Should Test All Similarly Situated Student-Athletes
Most schools only drug test those athletes participating in
extracurricular sports because they can tie participation in the
athletic program to a supposed voluntary consent to drug test-
ing. 127 However, schools that articulate a safety concern do not
attempt to test all "student-athletes," i.e. those participating in
physical education classes or intramural sports. These activities are
often conducted in an unstructured and undersupervised arena,
which is more likely to lead to injury of an impaired athlete than
in an interscholastic athletic competition. To date, no attempt has
been made to extend random drug testing programs to recreational
sport or physical education participants. Therefore, the safety
argument is more rhetoric than a reasoned basis for testing student-
athletes.
VI. Conclusion: The Encroachment on Privacy Rights Is Not
Justified by Drug Testing's Efficacy or Its Moral Purpose
The Court's holding in Acton will lead to further distrust
between teachers and students. Adults are already perceived as
126. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2394. The Seventh Circuit in Schaill minimized the importance
of the disclosure of extraneous information because it was only disclosed after a student
tested positive, and then, only to the school's athletic director. Schaill, 864 F.2d at 1322 n.19.
The Acton Court agreed with the Seventh Circuit that the extraneous information disclosure
argument was effectively rebutted by the possibilities that the information would only be
disclosed after a positive test and that the information would be disclosed to a limited
number of people. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2394.
127. The consent to be tested is not truly voluntary, as consent is conditioned on
participation in interscholastic athletics. Both the Schaill and Derdeyn courts recognized that
when consent is conditioned on the denial of a benefit in exchange for a waiver of Fourth
Amendment rights, the consent is of no effect. See Derdeyn, 863 P.2d at 947; Schaill, 864
F.2d at 1319; see also Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 583, 597 (1972).
The Acton Court impliedly recognized that an athlete's act of consenting to random
drug testing is not a waiver of constitutional rights because the Court declined to rely on the
athlete's consent as a dispositive factor.
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serving primarily an investigative and punitive role.1 8 Random
drug testing at schools only exacerbates the generational schism
between adults and children.
Although popular among a vast segment of society - from
government agencies to school boards - it is doubtful that random
drug testing actually deters a significant amount of drug use.
Programs that target only a sector of the student population, such
as athletes, may only force drug users to drop out of athletic
programs or out of school entirely.129 Programs based on in-
dividualized suspicion are more likely to catch drug users than
random tests, but they are also subject to abuses as the majority in
Acton acknowledged."
James Acton's testimony is stirring: "I feel that they have no
reason to think I was taking drugs.""13  Public reaction to the
Acton decision has centered on the elimination of suspicion and the
belief that government has now placed the burden of proof on the
individual. Thus, in the post-Acton world, everyone is guilty, and
one must prove one's innocence.'32
128. Justice O'Connor articulated this point as she scoffed at critics who state that testing
based on individualized suspicion will place teachers in an investigatory and hostile role.
Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2402-03 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Justice O'Connor remarked that
teachers are already viewed in that manner and, in fact, act in that capacity when supervising
students.
129. In Skinner, Justice Stevens articulated the overrated nature of drug testing's
deterrent effect by stating that even the threat of loss of employment may not be sufficient
to break the hold of addiction. Skinner, 489 U.S. at 634 (Stevens, J., concurring in part).
Similarly, the threat of the loss of participation in interscholastic athletics is not a significant
penalty to deter anything more than experimental use. Serious or even casual drug users are
unlikely to be deterred.
For instance, several successful college football players, such as Miami Hurricane
lineman Warren Sapp, allegedly used drugs prior to an important professional football
audition, which cost many of the players thousands, if not millions, of dollars. The fact that
talented college athletes, such as these, are unwilling to refrain, on the eve of a significant
drug test, from using drugs and are willing to sacrifice hundreds of thousands of dollars
weakens the validity of the argument that participation rights in interscholastic athletics
constitute an effective deterrent. See Hubert Mizell, Sapp Eager to Prove His Critics Wrong
as He Starts Pro Career, ROCKY MOUNTAIN NEWS, July 30, 1995, at 1313 ("[D]raft day
slippage cost Sapp a million dollars or two ....").
130. The extent of discretion afforded school officials in conducting the "search" is a
factor considered in the privacy analysis. Acton, 115 S. Ct. at 2395-96.
131. Id. at 2405 (O'Connor, J., dissenting).
132. Acton's father echoed this feeling, stating that drug testing "sends a message to
children that are trying to be responsible citizens ... that they have to prove that they're
innocent ... and I think that kind of sets a bad tone for citizenship." 'Id. (O'Connor, J.,
dissenting).
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Privacy rights must be zealously guarded or else government
- the school board in this incarnation - may encroach on all
fundamental rights.133 The Ninth Circuit stated poignantly in
Acton: "We have found that we must live with a certain amount
of discomfort, even danger, if we are to maintain constitutional
protections.'' 4 Drug testing violates a person's privacy in many
ways. Therefore, its use should be discouraged, especially among
schoolchildren.
The goal of testing is undoubtedly beneficial. However, the
means are misdirected, discriminatory, ineffectual and invasive.
The Court's holding in Acton sets a bad precedent by permitting
government encroachment on fundamental privacy rights.
133. The Supreme Court has traditionally recognized that school boards are arms of the
government which are capable of encroaching on individual liberties. West Virginia State
Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 636 (1943).
134. Acton, 23 F.3d at 1527.
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